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1. Introduction 
 
A common characteristic of the literature on tax policy in open economies and the tax compe-
tition in particular is that a country’s tax policy is modelled to be constrained by neighbouring 
countries’ fiscal policy (see Wilson, 1999, for a survey). The mechanisms of competition 
which potentially constrain national tax policy are diverse. They range from the mobility of 
capital and firms (Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986, and Wilson, 1986) over the mobility of 
paper profits within multinational corporations (Mintz and Smart, 2004) up to yardstick com-
petition phenomena where voters base their voting decision on the comparison between the 
domestic and foreign fiscal policies (Besley and Case, 1995).  
While both the theoretical and empirical literature on tax competition has reached an 
advanced stage, one assumption is rarely questioned: political decision makers are assumed to 
have an unbiased perception of tax policy constraints. Tax setting jurisdictions are regularly 
modelled as agents who – based on full and undistorted information with respect to the tax 
elasticity of tax bases – maximize their utility by choosing the level of taxation or the defini-
tion of the tax base. As a result, for a given environment tax policies of jurisdictions may dif-
fer as a consequence of differences in the preferences over an equity-efficiency trade off. Yet, 
the efficiency costs of levying taxes on mobile factors are assumed to be objective or at least 
to be perceived the same across decision makers (if distorted). 
We question this assumption and put it to an empirical test. We document a strong 
ideological bias among policy makers with respect to the perceived mobility of international 
tax bases. In contrast to the implicit assumption in the literature cited above there seems to be 
little consensus among policy makers as to how mobile firms and paper profits in an open 
economy are and hence what the efficiency cost of capital taxation are. Our findings are based 
on an original survey of members of the German national parliament (Bundestag) relating to 
their views on business tax policy. We do not only find an ideological bias in the perception 
of international mobility of tax bases, but we more generally detect the factors that influence 
the views of policy makers. Our survey identifies the members of parliament (MP) by name 
and hence we are in a position to condition the results on various control variables such as 
education of and information available to policy makers.  
The survey was conducted in late 2006 and early 2007. While not all members of par-
liament can be expected to be experts on tax policy, reform of company taxation was put high 
on the agenda by the coalition of Christian and Social Democrats governing Germany since 
late 2005. For this reason various tax reform proposals were discussed in the public during 
2005-7 and a specific business tax reform bill was passed by the German Bundestag a few 
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months after our survey in May 2007. The timing of our questionnaire thus falls in a period of 
general awareness about the international dimension of tax policy. The reason for the gov-
ernment’s priority of reforming company taxation at that time was the high level of taxation in 
Germany, despite an earlier reform under the previous government that already lowered the 
tax burden for corporations and non-corporations. Both in terms of statutory and effective 
marginal corporate tax rates Germany ranked highest among EU countries, and after the East-
ern enlargement of the EU, Germany borders or is close to countries with much lower tax 
rates (see for example Devereux et al., 2002, and for more recent data Haufler, 2006). 
Our main findings are as follows: First, ideological bias matters in explaining the poli-
ticians’ views on the three globalization and tax policy channels, and the bias matters quanti-
tatively more than most other control variables such as the politician’s profession, member-
ship in economics related parliament committees, years in parliament, and educational degree. 
In particular, there is a clear left-right bias in perception of real corporate mobility in re-
sponse to taxation. More left-wing politicians regard taxation as less important in company 
location decisions than right-wing politicians. However, the ideological bias is not always 
monotonic. Members of the center-left Social Democrats (SPD) believe that international 
profit shifting is much more prevalent than more right wing or liberal parties such as the cen-
ter-right Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and market-oriented Free Democrats (FDP), as 
well as the far Left party.  
Second, we obtain interesting insights with respect to the impact of the election mode 
by exploiting a particular feature of the German electoral system: About fifty percent of legis-
lators in the German parliament are elected directly in districts, while the other half is elected 
via a state party list, where seats are allocated to parties based on vote shares. Interestingly, 
party list MPs with arguably less direct contacts to regional constituencies perceive a lower 
real tax elasticity of companies compared to directly elected politicians. This result is in spirit 
of Stratmann and Baur (2002) who also exploit the differential election channel of German 
members of parliament. They find that directly elected politicians serve on committees that 
allow them to provide benefits to their district constituencies, while party list candidates serve 
on committees that provide benefits to the general party constituency (not geographically 
concentrated). 
Third, the yardstick competition hypothesis finds relatively little support in the Ger-
man Bundestag. In general, German politicians don’t believe that voters care much about 
other countries’ tax policies. Controlling again for the politician’s mode of election, however, 
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we find that directly elected politicians believe more strongly in the role of voters’ perception 
of other countries’ tax policies.  
We get our fourth finding when we proceed to explain the perceived degree of national 
autonomy in tax setting and use the answers to the three previous questions (the channels of 
globalization and tax policy) as explanatory variables. In addition, we also allow party mem-
bership to directly explain the responses by legislators. Political economy considerations sug-
gest that through the personal interest of a politician (e.g., high own capital income) party 
affiliation could matter if party membership were highly correlated with capital income. We 
find again a strong direct ideological bias. Ideology matters also indirectly, in particular via its 
impact on the perception of the profit shifting channel. Hence, party membership matters both 
directly and indirectly.  
Finally and fifth, we use the same approach to explain preferences for EU tax har-
monization and find that minimum tax rates for companies are more strongly favoured by left 
wing parties, even after controlling for the three globalization and tax policy channels. The 
direct ideology effect is quantitatively more important than the three channels of globaliza-
tion. Perhaps surprisingly, directly elected politicians tend to be more in favour of minimum 
tax rates.  
Robustness checks indicate that our key results are not distorted by a possible selec-
tion bias in the survey, which we accomplish by making use of a student control group. We 
also seek alternative confirmation that party membership in the Bundestag has indeed infor-
mation content with respect to the MP’s tax ideology. To this end we employ an indicator on 
party ideology from Benoit and Laver (2006) as an alternative to party dummies. The robust-
ness checks broadly confirm our general findings. 
To the best of our knowledge there exists hardly any survey based analyses of tax pol-
icy decision makers with the exception of contributions on politicians from Flemish munici-
palities (Ashworth and Heyndels, 1997, 2000). These authors survey local spokesmen of dif-
ferent parties in all Flemish municipalities with respect to their views on tax policy. Ashworth 
and Heyndels (1997) investigate the politicians’ opinion whether they regard their municipal-
ity’s level of taxes as “low” or “high”. Their results indicate that factors like the ideological 
position or tax levels in neighbouring jurisdiction influence this subjective assessment. 
Ashworth and Heyndels (2000) scrutinize how politicians prefer to change different types of 
taxes if tax revenues need to be raised or cut. They diagnose an asymmetry according to 
which tax cuts are concentrated upon one tax instrument (income tax) whereas tax increases 
tend to be diversified between different taxes. While the conceptual distinction between be-
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liefs on tax policy constraints and ideological attitudes towards taxation plays a role in these 
contributions, the analyses do neither focus on restrictions from real investment or paper 
profit mobility nor do they include respective questions.  
Our paper is structured as follows. In the next section we summarize what the tax 
competition literature assumes about political perceptions on constraints and contrast this with 
recent insights on the role of ideology and biases in the economic literature. In section 3, we 
provide relevant information relating to the German electoral and political system and the 
debate about company tax reform. We describe the survey and provide a summary of the data 
in section 4. In section 5 we present the structure of a simple two step approach in the forma-
tion of tax policy opinion and the estimation methodology. Subsequently, we turn in section 6 
to our key findings. Various robustness checks are analyzed in section 7 before we conclude 
with a hint to possible mechanisms of belief formation that could explain our finding and 
ideas for future work. 
 
 
2. Biased perceptions 
Theoretical tax competition models are rooted in the tradition of optimum taxation and built 
on the ingredients of rational expectations and full information on the side of tax policy mak-
ers and other economic agents. The full information assumption regularly holds also with re-
spect to the costs of taxation including, e.g., losses of tax base through mobility. This is the 
case in the seminal paper on real capital mobility, Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986), who as-
sume that identical jurisdictions compete for a fixed stock of capital. Subsequent modelling 
has widened the perspective by including further mobility phenomena. For example, Haufler 
and Schjelderup (2000) analyse the interactions of two countries allowing for the existence of 
foreign direct investment and profit shifting through manipulated transfer pricing. In this set-
ting, the taxing country faces additional tax base losses due to  paper profit mobility.  What is 
essential in our context is that, again, jurisdictions’ policy makers are modelled to have undis-
torted information on the elasticity of capital and profits.  
A further extension represents the models of yardstick competition. In the Besley and 
Case (1995) model voters cannot observe directly the cost of providing public goods and 
whether politicians are “good” or “bad”. By contrast, politicians are modelled to have full 
information. In particular, they know precisely how voters behave at the ballot box given their 
tax policy decision. The resulting strategic equilibrium is one of rational expectations both on 
the side of voters and incumbent politicians. 
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This short overview on the distinct basic tax competition models illustrates that full in-
formation and an undistorted perception of both economic and political restrictions are an 
overriding characteristic of the literature. Jurisdictions may differ with respect to their prefe-
rences but they all have the same (perceived) level of information on the phenomena which 
enter their optimization problem. Even in the models where information is assumed to be 
asymmetric (as it is the case for voters and politicians in the yardstick competition model) 
these asymmetries are not related to ideology. The less informed players are modeled to have 
a larger uncertainty on the true state but are nevertheless assumed to be unbiased. 
A testing strategy to substantiate this common approach of the literature, therefore, has 
to make a clear distinction between the perceptions of restrictions on the one hand and overall 
tax policy preferences on the other hand.  
Different justifications exist to put the key assumption of undistorted perceptions of 
tax policy restrictions to a test. Increasingly, the economic literature acknowledges the role of 
ideology, cognitive biases and limited information to effectively influence policy outcomes. 
On the empirical level, a number of contributions have shown that laypeople have significant-
ly different perceptions of economic phenomena compared to trained economists and that 
these differences point to biases in the general public’s perception of economic phenomena 
(Caplan, 2002, Blinder and Krueger, 2004). The role of misconceptions and voter ignorance is 
explored in explaining views on domestic tax policy in the U.S., such as Krupnikov et al. 
(2006) and Birney et al. (2006) on the repeal of the estate tax, and Slemrod (2003) on the re-
placement of the income tax by a flat or retail sales tax. It is hard to argue that these biases 
substantiated for voters should necessarily be absent for political decision makers. On the 
theoretical level, there is an increasing literature on the role of ideological misperceptions and 
their possible strategic stability of ideological views: Caplan (2007) argues that systematic 
belief errors are individually rational if the belief itself has consumption value. In principle, 
individuals could update their belief in view of contrary evidence. Yet the incentive to do so is 
too small because in large societies any single person has basically zero chance of being piv-
otal in an election. Bénabou (2008) presents a model of collectively sustained misperceptions 
for the efficiency of market versus government provision of goods such as education, health 
insurance or pensions. In contrast to Caplan he does not take a particular stance as to whether 
the state or government better solves allocation problems. Rather he lets agents choose 
whether to process or ignore contrary evidence and the incentives to do so depend on the vot-
ing and private decisions of other agents in the economy. Thus social cognitions are endoge-
nously derived and multiple equilibria are feasible, which makes public opinion path depend-
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ent. Alesina and Angeletos (2005) or Bénabou and Tirole (2006) propose the strategic stabili-
ty of opposing view on the relative role of effort or luck for individual economic success. 
Contrasting outcomes with a small welfare state and the belief in self-responsibility (“Ameri-
can equilibrium”) or a large welfare state and the belief that luck is crucial (“European equili-
brium”) are possible. 
A common thread of all these contributions is that subjects may act individually ra-
tional if they do stick to biased perceptions and ignore signals that their beliefs on economic 
mechanisms are erroneous. Although these theories largely aim at explaining attitudes and 
decisions regarding the effectiveness of markets and governments, it is not hard to imagine 
that this type of logic can be applied in the context of taxation and the constraints associated 
with open markets. Our findings are consistent with the above explanations. 
 
 
3. Institutional background  
 
In this section we provide information on two items relating to our survey: first the German 
electoral and political system, and second company tax reform under way in Germany while 
the survey was conducted. A careful description and analysis of the German party and elec-
toral system can be found in Roberts (1988) and Poguntke (1994). 
 
Germany’s electoral and political system 
Germany is a parliamentary democracy with two chambers, the lower house (Bundestag) and 
the upper house (Bundesrat), the latter representing the 16 states of Germany. The Bundestag 
elects the chancellor and thus controls the executive. Our survey is based on members of the 
Bundestag (or "parliament" henceforth). The Bundestag consists of (at least) 598 members, 
who are elected every four years. There are 299 districts, and each district is represented by 
one person who is elected by plurality rule. The other half of the parliament is elected based 
on vote shares for state party lists. We exploit this unique aspect in our empirical analysis 
below. The overall seat allocation in parliament is based on national vote shares of the second 
vote (e.g., proportional representation) subject to the requirement that a party needs to catch at 
least 5% of the national vote or win three districts.1  
                                                 
1
 A peculiarity of the German electoral system is that the share of the second vote determines the share of total 
seats in parliament, even if a party has won more districts (based on the first vote) than it should obtain based on 
the second vote. For this reason excess seats (Überhangmandate) are granted to a party that has won more dis-
tricts (from the first vote) than its proportional vote share would suggest. This explains why in the electoral pe-
riod 2005-9 the Bundestag had 614 (=598+16) members. 
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Broadly speaking parties can be characterized as follows: The Christian Democrats 
(CDU/CSU) are a centre-right party, while the Social Democrats (SPD) represent the centre-
left. The Free Democrats (FDP) are liberals in the sense of favoring a small government and 
low taxes, which makes them more market friendly than the Christian Democrats, who in turn 
are more market-oriented than the Social Democrats. The Left Party is drawing heavily on 
former communists in East Germany and disappointed Social Democrats from the left wing in 
West Germany. On economic policies the Left Party is to the left of the SPD. The Greens 
heavily focus on environmental and social policies with diverse views on economic issues, 
and are popular with relatively young, well educated people from the middle class.  
 
Company tax reform in Germany 
Prior to the 2008 corporate tax reform, tax rates in Germany on capital income, in particular 
corporate income, were high by international standards. For example, the nominal tax burden 
on retained profits in 2006 was about 37%, consisting of a 25% corporate tax rate plus local 
tax and the so-called solidarity charge. This made Germany a high tax country among OECD 
and EU countries. A similar picture arose with respect to effective marginal tax rates (see 
Haufler, 2006, for recent data). For this reason the government made up by Social Democrats 
and Christian Democrats agreed to reform company taxation after establishing their coalition 
in November 2005. The major objective of the government was to make Germany’s tax sys-
tem more competitive internationally, in particular for domestic and foreign investors in real 
capital. At the same time, there was fear about the shifting of paper profits out of Germany by 
multinational firms through means of transfer pricing and thin capitalization, and thus rules 
for securing tax revenues in Germany are aimed at. 
Shortly after our survey the coalition government of Christian and Social democrats pre-
sented a complex company tax and capital income tax reform bill (Deutscher Bundestag, 
2007a).  The main items of the bill, as relevant for the context of our survey, are the follow-
ing: 
− Reduction of nominal tax burden for retained profits by corporations from almost 39% to 
29,83%, mostly by a reduction of the corporate tax rate from 25 to 15%.  
− Provisions restricting the interest deductibility of loans for multinational firms.  
− Some changes to the definition of the corporate tax and local tax (Gewerbesteuer), which 
on balance reduced the marginal effective tax rates. 
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− The overall fiscal revenue loss is estimated to be 5 billion Euro annually in the long run 
(static effects, no behavioural adjustment assumed).  
 
The bill was passed with minor modifications by the Bundestag and the upper house (Bundes-
rat) in May and July of 2007, respectively, and became effective on January 1, 2008. Of the 
majority coalition parties, two members of the Christian democrats abstained, while all others 
voted in support. For the Social Democrats two opposed the bill and 15 abstained. The three 
smaller parties all voted against the bill, albeit for very different reasons.2  
 
4. Survey and Data  
 
The survey among the members of the German Parliament (Bundestag) started in November 
2006 and the last responses were recorded in February 2007. The legislators were contacted 
by written letters and subsequently by phone calls (when no initial response occurred). 157 
members of the German Bundestag participated by returning filled questionnaires resulting in 
a response rate of 25.6 percent with substantial differences across parties (see Table 1). Possi-
ble concerns about the differential response rates are addressed in our estimation approach 
and in subsequent robustness checks. 
The questionnaire included the following questions (original questions in German are 
available upon request) addressing perceptions of the three main channels of tax competition 
as discussed in the tax competition literature and some specific tax policy preferences: 
 
The Globalization and Tax Policy Channels: 
 
− Question 1 (Q1) on real corporate mobility: “The level of company taxation is men-
tioned as one factor for the location decision of companies. How important do you believe 
is the level of company taxation in this context?” 
− Question 2 (Q2) on profit shifting: “Reports suggest that companies use tax planning 
strategies to shift paper profits from high-tax to low-tax jurisdictions. How widespread do 
you think is this phenomenon?” 
                                                 
2
 The FDP thought that the tax rate cuts were too small, while the Left Party felt they were too large. The Green 
Party feared that the revenue impact was entirely unclear, non-corporations did not benefit enough, and various 
provisions would reduce rather than stimulate investment. 
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− Question 3 (Q3) on voter awareness: “Do you believe that voters consider tax rates in 
neighboring countries when forming an opinion on the appropriate level of company taxa-
tion in Germany?” 
 
Policy Questions: 
 
− Question 4 (Q4) on national autonomy: “Some people feel that globalization leads to a 
loss in national autonomy. Do you think that Germany still has any autonomy in the area 
of company taxation?” 
− Question 5 (Q5) on EU minimum tax: “In the current debate some have suggested that 
the EU should introduce a minimum tax for companies. Are you in favour of this pro-
posal?” 
 
Answers could be given on a discrete scale from 1 (“not at all”) to 9 (“very much”). 
The survey was conducted non-anonymously. However, confidentiality of individual 
responses was guaranteed. Hence, participating MPs had not to expect that either their party 
colleagues or voters would learn about their individual answers. In this respect, a confidential 
study like ours is superior to the analysis of recorded votes. Recorded votes, by definition, are 
public with the consequence that divergence from the party line or from voter preferences is 
threatened by sanctions. A fully anonymous survey which might reduce incentives to disguise 
a MP’s true beliefs even further is not an alternative. Full anonymity would preclude the iden-
tification of MPs individual characteristics which are indispensible for a meaningful analysis. 
Apart from party membership as the key variable for a MP’s ideological position we 
took account of variables related to a member’s education (tertiary degree), level of special-
ized information (proxied e.g. by membership in financial committee) and a group of further 
variables as summarized in Table 2 (for descriptive statistics see Table 3). This information 
was compiled from the Bundestag website3. While the precise classification of variables is 
debatable, in particular the distinction between education and information variables, the clas-
sification is helpful in our view. Education should be relevant for the ability to process infor-
mation, and the educational specialization (e.g., on economics or business) should hint to-
wards the degree of information about globalization restrictions. Similarly we would expect 
that certain professional experience (e.g. as a self-employed), the length of Bundestag mem-
bership, and the membership in specialized Bundestag committees serve as useful proxies for 
                                                 
3
 www.bundestag.de which also presents the MP’s CVs. 
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the degree of information on the tax policy environment. The inclusion of economic education 
and specialized committee membership in the subsequent testing also alleviates a subtle prob-
lem in the answer patterns:4 It may simply be the case that individuals who do not care about 
location decision of firms will answer that the tax elasticity is low. Since economic knowl-
edge and expertise serve as a natural proxy for the importance assigned to the issue of firm 
mobility we thus limit the risk that ideological heterogeneity of perceptions simply mirrors the 
variance in importance assigned to the topic in general. 
Among other variables we include dummies to differentiate between Eastern and 
Western German, male and female, direct and party list MPs. We also account for age. The 
heterogeneity of the economic and political environment in Eastern and Western Germany 
may impact results also because Eastern Germans have a different view on the role of the 
state (Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007). Empirical studies have also pointed to a signifi-
cantly different focus of female representatives compared to their male colleagues: Female 
legislators tend to have different policy priorities and are more likely to express concerns 
about social policy issues (Thomas, 1994; Seltzer et al., 1997). Hence, gender may be taken as 
a proxy for the specific policy specialization and, hence, interest for and information on tax 
issues. Finally, MPs elected directly in a district and not through a party list may have more 
direct contact with citizens and companies which could be relevant for the perception of glob-
alization constraints.5 
As pointed out in the introduction personal interests may well influence opinion. For 
this reason we also experimented with an additional variable that relates to income of legisla-
tors other than their uniform compensation for their status as member of parliament. This side 
income (Nebeneinkünfte) of MPs originates from occupations unrelated to the seat in 
Bundestag such as self-employment, membership in company supervisory bodies, paid 
speeches or other. Revenues from these activities are legal for German MPs, but - following a 
ruling of German’s constitutional court in summer 2007 - have to be published. Unfortu-
nately, the publication requirement is limited and requires information about income in three 
intervals so that the quality of the resulting data is relatively poor. This may explain that an 
inclusion of a side income variable did not have significant results (not reported), although 
                                                 
4
 We owe this insight to the comment of an anonymous referee. 
5
 The distinction between the two types of members of parliaments is somewhat blurry in so far as MPs elected 
via the party list are sometimes candidates in a district and were not elected. We also experimented with a modi-
fied party list variable taking account of the relative position of the MP on a party list relative to the maximum 
number of places on the list which in the election 2005 qualified for a seat in Bundestag (results not reported). 
This relative position did not prove to be important. 
 11
from a theoretical point of view this variable could be a proxy for private interests or informa-
tion aspects with respect to corporate tax policy. 
Finally, we also included basic economic characteristics of the individual MP’s federal 
state in order to allow for special interests related to a constituency’s specific needs. State 
economic characteristics could matter in so far as half of all legislators are elected from state 
party lists as described in section 2.  
A first look at descriptive statistics allows us to make two interesting observations. 
First, there is large variation in opinions within most parties for almost all questions. At the 
same time, however, we observe a strong correlation between ideology measured on the basis 
of party affiliation and the average answer to the five questions (Table 4).6 With the exception 
of the voter awareness question (Q3), responses to all questions differ by party affiliation. 
This result may not come as a complete surprise when normative issues such as the desirabil-
ity of an EU minimum tax on companies is considered. However, the strong correlation of 
perceived globalization restrictions and ideology is harder to explain and may hint to an ideo-
logical bias in information processing, as it has been shown to be virulent in the population at 
large for the perception of economic issues in general (Blinder and Krueger, 2004; Caplan, 
2002). In the following we dig deeper into this question by disentangling the ideological im-
pact on globalization views from other influences related to education, information and the 
other individual characteristics of Bundestag members. 
 
 
 
5. The formation of tax policy opinions and estimation approach 
 
The rational formation of tax policy opinions can be described as a two step procedure. In a 
first step, decision makers collect information on the tax policy environment. With regard to 
globalization this relates to an assessment of three channels: first, the tax elasticity of real 
investment (RI), second, the tax elasticity of paper profits (PP) and third, the reaction of vot-
ers to tax developments abroad i.e., yardstick competition (YC). In a second step, decision 
makers choose the tax policy which maximizes their specific objective function. For example, 
they vote for minimum taxes (M) or they decide to which extent they stick to an autonomous 
tax policy (A) even at a cost of increasing outward mobility. This two step approach reflects 
the common structure of the tax competition models summarized in section 2: Optimization 
                                                 
6
 In section 6 we address the link between ideology and party membership in detail. 
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and, hence, tax policy decisions are based on the existing constraints. However, in contrast to 
the theoretical tax (competition) literature we now put the assumption of an undistorted con-
sensus on these restrictions to a test. For that purpose, our testing approach focuses on the 
impact of party ideology (IDE). If – as assumed in the optimum taxation literature – the effi-
ciency costs of taxation are objectively perceived, the awareness of restrictions should not 
differ among parties. However, ideology should directly influence the second step following 
conventional theory. Representatives with different subjective equity-efficiency trade-offs 
should have different tax policy preferences even if they fully agree on the relevance of the 
three globalization and tax policy channels (e.g., see the standard Meltzer-Richard, 1981, 
model of redistributive taxation in a closed economy).  
The appropriateness of these expectations on the impact of ideology is now tested 
within the following set-up: To analyze the formation of beliefs on tax policy restrictions un-
der globalization - the first step – models of the following type are considered:  
 
(1a)  PRI = fRI (EDU, INF, OIN, STC, IDE) 
(1b)  PPP = fPP (EDU, INF, OIN, STC, IDE) 
(1c)  PYC = f YC(EDU, INF, OIN, STC, IDE) 
 
The perception P of each of the three channels may be influenced by the individual MP’s 
education EDU, his or her availability of objective information INF, other individual charac-
teristics OIN, and particular economic characteristics of the legislator’s state STC as suggested 
above. Finally, ideology IDE as a possible additional determinant of perceptions is included.  
In a second step the formation of tax policy opinions is finalized by translating the 
perceived restrictions into preferred policy options, which in turn depend on an individual’s 
objective function. Here we would expect that decision makers with similar perceptions of 
restrictions should tend to see more room for an autonomous tax policy if they put a relatively 
large weight on equity relative to efficiency. Similarly, the preference for minimum taxes 
should not only be influenced by the perceived restrictions but also by ideology because 
minimum taxes tend to offer more room for redistributive objectives. To test for the relative 
role of ideology in the second step, models of the following types are considered:  
 
 
(2a) A = fA (PRI, PPP, PYC, EDU, INF, OIN, STC, IDE) 
 
(2b)  M = fM(PRM, PPP, PYC, EDU, INF, OIN, STC, IDE) 
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The belief in tax autonomy (A) and the preference for an EU minimum tax (M) are modelled 
as a function of the perceived restrictions and of ideology directly. The impact of education, 
influence and other individual characteristics is included in the second step of formation of 
tax policy positions. 
Our survey of the members of the German Bundestag allows us to test for the de-
scribed structure in the formation of tax policy opinions. We proceed by estimating ordered 
probit models for the answers Q1-Q3 representing the perceived restrictions according to the 
first step equations (1a)-(1c). We then continue by analyzing the second step by estimating 
ordered probit models for the answers to Q4 (related to equation 2a) and Q5 (equation 2b). 
Several standard problems of econometric testing of survey data have to be addressed 
(see Hanson et al., 2005, or Mayda and Rodrik, 2005, for similar approaches): The highly 
different response rates of different parties point to a selection bias which could influence 
estimation results. Therefore, we estimate weighted ordered probit models, where weights 
correct for the sample’s lacking representativeness. Our weights are based on two strata of the 
sample: party membership and years in Bundestag which both are highly significant in a non-
response analysis. Even these measures cannot exclude that a selection bias can still in princi-
ple contaminate the results and we return to this issue in section 6. 
Furthermore the descriptive analysis indicates that the variance of answers differs 
widely between parties. To cope with the resulting problems we allow for party clustered er-
ror terms, i.e. the usual assumption of uncorrelated error terms is given up for observations 
from the same party. As a consequence, our estimation procedure is robust against unobserved 
variables or structures which lead to a larger homogeneity of answers within one party.  
The specification included the proxies for education, information, other individual 
characteristics and economic structure as they are listed in section 2.  
 
 
6. Results 
 
First step results 
Estimation results for the three first step models reveal a different overall fit of the models 
(Table 5). Whereas estimations show reasonable properties for the perception of real mobility 
and profit shifting, the estimation for yardstick competition has hardly any explanatory power. 
There is support for the relevance of information proxies and less for the importance of educa-
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tion. Economic state characteristics do not show up significantly apart from a weakly signifi-
cant impact of the unemployment rate in the yardstick competition equation. These results 
indicate that belief formation on German tax policy is not clearly linked to special interests of 
a MP’s constituency. 
Among the information variables memberships in the financial committee responsible 
for tax policy, the length of Bundestag membership and professional experience as self-
employed lawyer, tax consultant etc. (“Freiberufler”) clearly influence the perception of the 
tax mobility environment. The MPs with a professional background as self-employed tend to 
stress the importance of paper profit mobility, while they regard real mobility as less impor-
tant compared to their colleagues among the members of Bundestag. Members of the financial 
committee who should - with regard to tax policy - be the best informed members of 
Bundestag tend to stress real mobility as a relevant restriction. The same holds for those MPs 
with a longer tenure in the Bundestag. The other variables – Eastern/Western German, gender, 
party list and age – also turn out to be important although to a different degree for the three 
channels. Female members assess globalization restrictions to be more severe compared to 
their male colleagues. Eastern German MPs have fewer concerns about profit shifting. Party 
list MPs assess real mobility and yardstick competition as less pronounced than MPs voted 
into the parliament directly by a district - a plausible result given the fact that district repre-
sentatives should have more salient experience with company decision making. 
Beyond these detailed findings, however, the essential result is the clear and over-
whelming impact of ideology on the perception of globalization restrictions. Thus, the finding 
of the descriptive data analysis (Table 4) is obviously no statistical artefact and is strongly 
supported in the multivariate model. Ideology measured on the basis of party membership is 
not only highly significant: Judged on the size of marginal effects (for each question evalu-
ated at the most frequent answer category) party membership also outweighs the impact of 
information, education or other variables and these ideological marginal effects are particu-
larly pronounced for real mobility. It is striking that the ordering of party effects for the per-
ception of real mobility corresponds to the left right spectre: Compared to the liberal FDP the 
parties regard real mobility of companies the less important the further left their political ori-
entation is. Our results strongly reject the hypothesis that ideology is unimportant in the first 
step of opinion building. Hence, our results challenge the key assumption of standard models 
of tax policy decision making, in which an objective mobility of tax bases is assumed. 
We like to emphasize that the impact of ideology on the perception of constraints can 
hardly be explained by a MP’s incentive to consciously hide his or her true beliefs. First, as 
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argued in section 4, individual answers in the underlying survey were confidential so that 
fears of sanctions for a divergence from official party lines were not warranted. Second, the 
perception of mobility phenomena as such is hardly an “ideological issue” where a diverging 
opinion – even if it became public – would pose harm to the individual MP. Note, however, 
that subconscious mechanisms may well be present and even be a key explanation for our 
findings. We return to this possibility in our overall conclusions. 
Neither are reversed causation problems likely to distort the results to any serious de-
gree. We believe that the perception of tax competition constraints is not crucial for the deci-
sion on party membership so that a reversed causation channel should have no major rele-
vance. 
 
Second step results 
The results for the estimation of ordered probit models for answers to Q4 (autonomy) and Q5 
(minimum taxes) are presented in Table 6. Based on models (2a) and (2b) we would expect 
that two classes of variables are important: on the one hand the perceived globalization re-
strictions and on the other hand individual characteristics linked to a MP’s education, infor-
mation, his or her state’s economic characteristics and ideology.  
The regression diagnostics show a good fit, as both models show a high share of cor-
rect classifications. The first surprising result of the second step results is the loose link be-
tween perceived restrictions on the one hand and the perception of tax autonomy and the 
minimum tax preference on the other hand. Among the three globalization channels only per-
ceived paper profit mobility is significant in both equations. As expected, a larger perceived 
profit shifting is associated with less autonomy and a larger preference for minimum taxes. 
Real mobility is weakly significant in the autonomy equation but with a surprising sign: Per-
ception of high real mobility is associated with a more autonomous assessment. Education 
variables are significant: a degree qualifying for university entry is associated with a percep-
tion of less autonomy and less marked preferences for tax harmonization. Interestingly, a uni-
versity degree increases the perceived autonomy. Information variables have more importance 
for the view on harmonization than on autonomy. With more years in the Bundestag the pref-
erences for minimum taxes decline. Perhaps not surprisingly, members of the budgetary 
committee see more autonomy compared to other MPs. Apart from that they are characterized 
by more scepticism towards EU minimum taxes. Formerly self-employed “Freiberufler” have 
a stronger tendency to favour minimum taxes. Among the other variables only the Eastern 
Germany and the party list dummy are significant: MPs directly elected by a district show 
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significantly larger sympathy for minimum taxes, representatives from the Eastern part of the 
country see less autonomy. State characteristics are of importance in the minimum tax model 
insofar as MPs both from relatively wealthy states and states with high unemployment prefer 
minimum taxes more than others.  
The essential result with respect to the impact of party membership is again its high 
significance. While the size of marginal effects for party membership in the autonomy equa-
tion is comparable to the other types of variables, party affiliation by far outweighs the other 
in the explanation of tax harmonization preferences. The impact of ideology in the second 
step is less surprising compared to the first step results because subjective equity-efficiency 
trade-offs should influence the formation of tax policy opinions for a given perception of re-
strictions. 
 
7. Robustness 
 
We argued above that ideology strongly affects the perception of tax competition channels. 
However, it is disputable whether party membership in our survey is really a good proxy for 
ideology. Two kinds of problems have to be discussed, first with respect to the nature of par-
ties and the belief formation within parliamentary party factions and, second, with respect to 
the technical issue of selection bias in our survey. 
 
 
Belief formation within a party faction 
For a legislator party membership is a variable representing a complex set of issues. Parties do 
not only unite politicians with similar ideologies and perceptions, they also impose constraints 
on their members. For example, Murphy and Shleifer (2004) suggest that parties can be re-
garded as social networks which allow for an easy influence on opinions of network members. 
Party members and legislators from a specific party in particular could thus be the victims of 
party manipulation activities. Thus it is unclear whether the statistical significance of party 
membership is really the consequence of deeply rooted ideology and resulting psychological 
process of information filtering or the consequence of party information processes. An exam-
ple in the context of the German company tax reform is the Social-Democratic finance minis-
ter Peer Steinbrück’s strategy to cope with resistance in his party and trade unions against tax 
cuts for companies. In reaction to this he stressed the base broadening elements of the reform 
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as a means to fight paper profit mobility7. Thus, the argument of high paper profit mobility 
was highly present in the SPD’s reform debate. In this sense, the concern of social-democratic 
legislators about profit shifting (Table 4, Table 5) could to a certain extent mirror the effect of 
this information campaign. 
Furthermore, the individual MP is heavily dependent on the support of his party for his 
further career prospects. Hence, the impact of party membership as measured in our analysis 
may represent phenomena like group dependence, loyalty or information biases and is there-
fore no undistorted proxy for ideology.  
 
Selection bias 
On a technical level, the identification of ideology on the basis of party membership may be 
impeded by a selection bias. Highly different response rates between party factions (see Table 
1) imply the risk that party membership could simply mirror the effect of hidden variables 
having an impact on participation in the survey. Therefore, without further checks we cannot 
be certain that our party membership variable truly reflects ideology.  
 
7.1 Control group results 
As a first approach to check the importance of both caveats we conducted an identical survey 
among a control group of economics students at the University of Mannheim in February 
2007. In addition to the five questions explained in section 3, students were asked to reveal 
their party preferences. The survey was conducted anonymously. Obviously, loyalty consid-
erations, political career aspects or specific information networks do not play a role for this 
control group. Thus, the resulting data allow us to check for the link between ideology and 
globalization perceptions because party preference is a more unambiguous proxy of ideology 
than in the case of the Bundestag. Neither a distorting selection bias originating from motives 
to hide a true position should be present for this control group. As information proxies we 
included two questions: One for the number of semesters which the student has already been 
studying economics and a second question whether the student had attended an introductory 
public finance lecture. Among other individual characteristics the respondents were asked to 
indicate gender and nationality (German/non-German). 
Tables 7 and 8 present the results for the three tax competition channels (model 1a, 1b 
and 1c) and the second step regressions (model 2a and 2b) for the control group. Similar to 
                                                 
7
 In a typical statement addressing his party members Steinbrück argues: “Through tax cuts and targeted meas-
ures against profit shifting this reform will provide a constant decrease of the fairness gap between profits real-
ized in Germany and profits actually taxed” (Steinbrück, 2007). 
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the survey among legislators the real mobility and paper profit equations perform better than 
the yardstick competition equation. Again party association has a highly significant impact on 
the perception of competition phenomena. For real mobility, even the ordering of the party 
impact is identical to the Bundestag results: The further left is the party preference the lower 
is the importance assigned to real mobility. For paper profit mobility the ordering of party 
effects is quite different however: While for individuals with preference for the SPD the effect 
is not significantly different from those who favour the liberal FDP (our reference case), stu-
dents who prefer the other parties perceive less paper profit mobility compared to the FDP 
supporters. For the Bundestag, the governing parties SPD and CDU/CSU are characterized by 
a particularly high awareness of paper profit mobility. For the second step results it is striking 
that perceived restrictions do not appear to be linked at all to the autonomy perception or the 
preference for minimum taxes. Thus, the surprising result of a weak impact of restrictions 
relative to ideology in the second step is even reinforced by the control group results. 
Taken together the control group results provide reassurance that the key Bundestag 
results about the impact of ideology in both steps are no statistical artefact caused by either 
party faction effects or a selection bias in the Bundestag survey. However, the different order-
ing of party effects in the paper profit equation indicates that the Bundestag party effect is to a 
certain extent also influenced by specific information processes within the parliament. 
 
 
7.2 Party membership and ideology 
 
As a further robustness test, we replace party dummies by indicators on the ideological posi-
tion of parties from political science scholars. In their influential study, Benoit and Laver 
(2006) present programmatic indicators for parties from 47 countries. The indicators are based 
on interviews with experts who are academics specializing in political parties and electoral 
politics of his or her country. For the assessment of the German parties interviews from 98 
experts were available. The respondents were asked to locate each party on a general left-right 
scale from 1 (left) to 20 (right) “taking all aspects of party policy into account.” While the 
authors left the precise interpretation of “left” and “right” to the experts, they analysed from 
further programmatic questions, which dimensions of politics explain these expert judge-
ments. For Germany, the left-right-location is driven by the experts’ judgements on parties’ 
positions both in economic and social policy with the latter including positions on abortion, 
homosexuality and euthanasia. Hence, this indicator can be used as a proxy for a party’s over-
all ideology beyond the narrow field of tax policy. Table 9 summarizes the results for the first 
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step regression where the Benoit-Laver-indicator8 replaces the party dummies of the Table 5 
specifications. 
The overwhelming role of ideology for the perception or real mobility is strongly re-
confirmed when the left-right indicators with its specific ordering of German parties is im-
posed: The marginal effect of the Benoit-Laver-indicator amounts to 0.27 for the ideological 
difference between the Left Party and CDU/CSU and thus is substantially larger than all the 
significant dummies’ marginal effects. Again, the parties further right tend to stress real mo-
bility compared to the parties further left. For the perception of paper profits ideology is 
highly significant as well but does not clearly outweigh the other significant control variables. 
This finding supports the view that our party dummies are indeed a useful proxy of ideology 
and that the stipulated ideology effect not merely reflects other partisan effects (constraints on 
party members, biased information within party networks and the like). Note that the signs of 
control variables remain robust even though some lose (party list and age for real mobility, 
financial committee for yardstick competition) or gain (female and party list for paper profit 
mobility) significance. 
 
 
8. Conclusion  
 
To the best of our knowledge this is the first paper to survey the opinions of policy makers 
with respect to tax policy at a time of increasing international integration. Policy makers are 
an interesting group to consider, as they actually vote on policies directly and probably are 
better informed than average citizens. The survey of German legislators was done at a time 
when tax policy reform was high on the agenda and a few months after the survey the 
Bundestag actually voted on a reform bill that will lower the statutory and effective tax rates 
on companies in Germany. The main finding of our analysis is the identification of a strong 
ideological bias in the legislators’ views on the interaction between globalization and tax pol-
icy. This suggests that the perceived efficiency costs of taxation in open economies differ sys-
tematically across political ideologies.  
Our results are also interesting from a comparative politics perspective. Germany is a 
parliamentary democracy in which party discipline is strong and the candidate selection proc-
ess is heavily regulated by the constitution and party law. Our survey sheds light on how 
much variation in opinions among legislators within a party exists. Party discipline seems to 
                                                 
8
 The left-right scores for the Bundestag parties from Benoit and Laver (2006) are as follows: Left Party 3.6, 
Greens 7.1, SPD 8.4, FDP 13.4, CDU/CSU 13.6. 
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work quite well given the fairly uniform voting behaviour along party lines on the actual tax 
reform bill relative to the wide variation of opinions in our survey.  
One caveat is important. At this point we are unable to identify the precise mechanism 
which is responsible for the strong impact of ideology. The insights from the perception of 
paper profit shifting indicate that specific information networks or campaigns could have an 
impact in shaping party members views. An alternative channel could originate from the 
characteristics which are typical for the successful career of party members up to winning a 
seat in Parliament. It may well be the case that only individuals who are subject to the same 
biases as their fellow party members and their party’s electorate will be able to climb the 
party career ladder. Both economic and psychological approaches exist which help to specifiy 
these types of biasing group mechanisms. In his economic theory of religious knowledge, 
Hardin (1997) describes a mechanism of religious belief formation which may equally be 
relevant in the context of belief formation on economic facts in a political group: If belief x 
dominates in a certain group it will be in the interest of the group’s individual members to 
profess belief in x in order to enjoy the acceptance of the group. As a consequence of com-
munication within this group a member receives information which will tend to reconfirm this 
group belief. Even a member who initially only pretended to hold a certain belief in order to 
safeguard his position in the group will perceive a growing body of (group) evidence that this 
belief is the true one. Thus even biased beliefs can be stable. The classical psychological ap-
proach would be an application of the theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957): Indi-
viduals only tend to correct their beliefs if the negative feelings (i.e. the cognitive dissonance) 
resulting from the contradiction between prior beliefs and perceived evidence becomes too 
strong. The information networks of a political party with their ideological biases shield their 
members from information contradicting their political views. Hence, party memberships may 
help to stick to beliefs which are in an obvious contrast to the evidence which is available to 
non-members. In the context of our survey this can explain why political preferences e.g. on 
the desirable distributive role of corporate taxation can feed back into the perception of re-
strictions from tax competition. Therefore, what may be new to neoclassical models of tax 
competition will hardly come as a surprise from a psychological point of view. 
Future research should attempt to overcome our incomplete understanding of the proc-
ess which drives the formations of perceptions on globalization constraints. One way to tackle 
the issue is to get more information from the policy makers themselves, for example, by ask-
ing them how they form their opinion. We did not pursue this possibility with the legislators 
from the German Bundestag, as it proved fairly difficult to get them to answer just our six 
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questions. We expect more willingness to participate when policy makers from lower level of 
governments are surveyed. In this context future research should survey policy makers from 
competing jurisdictions and compare their perceived degree of competition with estimates 
from a strategic interaction model where actual tax rates are the key endogenous variables. 
This approach would allow to find independent confirmation for or modification of existing 
theories of fiscal competition. 
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Table 1: Response rate by party in the Bundestag 
Party  Number of seats Responses Response rate 
CDU/CSU 225 53 23,56 
SPD 222 33 14,86 
FDP 61 32 52,46 
Left Party 53 27 50,94 
Alliance 90/The Greens 51 12 23,53 
Members without fraction 2 0 0,00 
Total 614 157 25,57 
 
Table 2: Variable definitions 
Variable Unit Explanations 
 
Education variables 
Abitur  Dummy Secondary qualification for university entrance 
Tertiary degree Dummy  Degree from university or polytechnic 
 
Proxies for degree of information and experience 
Economics/business Dummy Tertiary education in business administration or economics 
Self-employed 
“Freiberufler” 
Dummy Last professional position as an independent lawyer, tax 
advisor or in a similar self-employed occupation 
Years in Bundestag Discrete 
variable 
Calculated as 2007 minus year of Bundestag entry, interrup-
tions are taken into account 
Member financial 
committee 
Dummy Deals with tax policy, financial markets, monetary policy 
Member budget com-
mittee 
Dummy Deals with federal government budget, in particular expendi-
ture side 
 
Other variables 
Eastern Germany Dummy Member of parliament from a district or a party list in Eastern 
Germany  
Female Dummy  
Party list Dummy Not elected directly from a district but qualified for Bundestag 
by position on a party list 
Age Discrete 
variable 
Calculated as 2007 minus year of birth 
State characteristics 
Unemployment rate Continuous 
variable 
in % for the year 2006, source: German Statistical Office 
GDP per capita  Continuous 
variable 
In Euro for the year 2006, source: German Statistical Office 
Sources: Bundestag if no other source is named. 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable 
 
Unit Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Education variables 
Abitur  Dummy 0.80 0.40 0 1 
Tertiary degree  Dummy 0.86 0.35 0 1 
Proxies for degree of information and experience 
Economics/business  Dummy 0.22 0.42 0 1 
Self-employed 
“Freiberufler”  
Dummy 0.16 0.37 0 1 
Years in Bundestag Years 6.78 5.45 1 27 
Member financial 
committee Dummy 0.18 0.39 0 1 
Member budget com-
mittee Dummy 0.17 0.38 0 1 
Other variables 
Eastern Germany  Dummy 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Female Dummy 0.33 0.47 0 1 
Party list Dummy 0.64 0.48 0 1 
Age Years 49.82 9.77 23 69 
State characteristics 
Unemployment rate  % 10.7 4.2 6.3 19.0 
GDP per capita Euro 2006 27,529 5,427 19,112 49,318 
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Table 4: Survey results by party membership 
 Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Q1 Real corporate mobility 
FDP 32 7.41 1.36 3 9 
CDU/CSU 53 6.68 1.48 3 9 
SPD 33 5.76 1.52 2 9 
Greens 12 4.67 1.50 3 8 
Left Party 27 3.93 1.47 2 8 
Total 157 6.01 1.88 2 9 
Anova, F-Test p-value: 0.000 
Q2 Profit shifting 
FDP 31 5.81 1.60 3 8 
CDU/CSU 53 6.21 1.54 3 9 
SPD 33 7.55 1.52 2 9 
Greens 12 7.00 1.04 5 8 
Left Party 27 7.07 1.88 3 9 
Total 156 6.62 1.69 2 9 
Anova, F-Test p-value: 0.000 
Q3 Voter awareness 
FDP 32 4.50 2.66 1 9 
CDU/CSU 53 4.25 1.95 1 9 
SPD 33 3.55 1.94 1 8 
Greens 12 4.08 2.07 1 7 
Left Party 27 4.19 1.78 1 7 
Total 157 4.13 2.09 1 9 
Anova, F-Test p-value: 0.444 
Q4 National autonomy 
FDP 32 6.53 1.67 2 9 
CDU/CSU 53 6.72 1.56 3 9 
SPD 33 5.94 1.20 3 7 
Greens 12 6.50 0.67 6 8 
Left Party 27 7.37 1.71 2 9 
Total 157 6.61 1.54 2 9 
Anova, F-Test p-value: 0.009 
Q5 EU minimum taxes 
FDP 32 2.50 2.36 1 8 
CDU/CSU 52 4.48 2.75 1 9 
SPD 33 7.82 1.76 3 9 
Greens 12 7.33 1.07 5 9 
Left Party 26 8.35 0.98 6 9 
Total 155 5.65 3.08 1 9 
Anova, F-Test p-value: 0.000 
Q6 Equity 
FDP 32 5.38 2.04 1 9 
CDU/CSU 52 6.81 1.63 3 9 
SPD 33 7.61 1.64 3 9 
Greens 12 7.67 1.07 6 9 
Left Party 27 8.59 0.64 7 9 
Total 156 7.06 1.88 1 9 
Anova, F-Test p-value: 0.000 
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Table 5: Ordered probit estimation: Tax policy restrictions 
 
Q1: Mobility real 
capital 
Model 1a 
Q2: Mobility paper prof-
its 
Model 1b 
Q3: Yardstick 
competition 
Model 1c 
Variable Coefficient Marginal 
effect* Coefficient 
Marginal 
effect* Coefficient 
Marginal 
effect* 
Education 
Secondary (“Abitur”) 0.363** (0.156) 0.053 
0.237 
(0.306) 0.007 
0.055 
(0.215) -0.013 
Tertiary 0.135 (0.216) 0.019 
-0.222 
(0.594) 0.003 
-0.228 
(0.231) 0.053 
Information 
Economic/business -0.145 (0.461) -0.020 
-0.181 
(0.139) -0.004 
-0.036 
(0.255) 0.008 
“Freiberufler” -0.373*** (0.129) -0.055 
0.394*** 
(0.135) -0.012 
0.263** 
(0.134) -0.061 
Years in Bundestag 0.055*** (0.014) 0.007 
-0.042*** 
(0.011) 0.000 
-0.003 
(0.016) 0.001 
Member financial commit-
tee 
0.457*** 
(0.127) 0.051 
-0.107 
(0.160) -0.002 
0.182* 
(0.109) -0.043 
Member budget committee -0.300 (0.261) -0.043 
0.341 
(0.392) -0.008 
-0.030 
(0.140) 0.007 
Other individual characteristics 
Eastern Germany 0.301 (0.241) 0.037 
-0.779*** 
(0.200) -0.061 
0.688*** 
(0.221) -0.150 
Female 0.583*** (0.203) 0.067 
0.273 
(0.169) -0.002 
0.157 
(0.161) -0.037 
Party list -0.283** (0.116) -0.038 
-0.062 
(0.098) -0.001 
-0.439** 
(0.203) 0.102 
Age -0.016** (0.008) -0.002 
0.006 
(0.007) 0.000 
0.004 
(0.008) -0.001 
State characteristics 
Unemployment rate 0.020 (0.023) 0.003 
0.101 
(0.078) 0.001 
-0.060* 
(0.036) 0.014 
GDP per capita 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 
0.000 
(0.000) 0.000 
0.000 
(0.000) 0.000 
Party 
CDU/CSU -0.795*** (0.076) -0.110 
0.170 
(0.169) 0.000 
-0.276** 
(0.108) 0.065 
SPD -1.522*** (0.156) -0.190 
1.155*** 
(0.226) -0.036 
-0.656*** 
(0.101) 0.149 
GREENS -2.215*** (0.128) -0.235 
0.501*** 
(0.094) -0.025 
-0.363*** 
(0.102) 0.083 
LEFT PARTY -2.856*** (0.274) -0.248 
1.019*** 
(0.247) -0.096 
-0.034 
(0.209) 0.008 
Regression diagnostics 
p-value joint significance 
of variables 0.000 0.068 0.000 
p-value joint significance 
party dummies 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 157 156 157 
Share correct 
classifications 
(exact hit/absolute classifi-
cation error <=1) 
0.261/0.745 0.244/0.718 0.204/0.484 
Pseudo-R2 0.130 0.090 0.026 
Party: FDP (liberal party) dummy not included; *marginal effect at mode (Q1: 7, Q2: 7, Q3: 2); 
*/**/***: significant at 10/5/1 percent level. 
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Table 6: Ordered probit estimation: Tax policy 
Q4: Autonomy of tax policy 
Model 2a 
Q5: Preference minimum taxes 
Model 2b 
Variable Coefficient Marginal effect* Coefficient Marginal effect* 
Perceived restrictions 
Real mobility (Q1) 0.196* (0.113) 0.025 
-0.100 
(0.062) -0.025 
Paper profits (Q2) -0.073** (0.033) -0.009 
0.177** 
(0.089) 0.044 
Yardstick (Q3) 0.012 (0.052) 0.002 
-0.045 
(0.071) -0.011 
Education 
Secondary (“Abitur”) -0.414*** (0.150) -0.036 
-0.442* 
(0.232) -0.123 
Tertiary 0.669*** (0.150) 0.123 
-0.130 
(0.407) -0.034 
Information 
Economic/business 0.185 (0.158) 0.021 
0.007 
(0.230) 0.002 
“Freiberufler” 0.143 (0.267) 0.016 
0.382*** 
(0.086) 0.107 
Years in Bundestag -0.031 (0.025) -0.004 
-0.040** 
(0.016) -0.010 
Member financial 
committee 
0.168 
(0.283) 0.019 
-0.229 
(0.223) -0.053 
Member budget committee 0.245* (0.139) 0.025 
-0.404* 
(0.220) -0.088 
Other individual characteristics 
Eastern Germany -0.403* (0.220) -0.067 
-0.046 
(0.318) -0.011 
Female -0.022 (0.162) -0.003 
-0.178 
(0.119) -0.043 
Party list -0.012 (0.284) -0.002 
-0.584*** 
(0.137) -0.148 
Age 0.009 (0.014) 0.001 
0.019 
(0.014) 0.005 
State characteristics 
Unemployment rate 0.071 (0.059) 0.009 
0.113* 
(0.068) 0.028 
GDP per capita 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 
0.000** 
(0.000) 0.000 
Party 
CDU/CSU 0.362* (0.204) 0.040 
0.563*** 
(0.113) 0.150 
SPD 0.013 (0.177) 0.002 
2.038*** 
(0.115) 0.582 
GREENS 0.438 (0.379) 0.028 
1.835*** 
(0.266) 0.630 
LEFT PARTY 1.460*** (0.344) -0.107 
2.666*** 
(0.244) 0.814 
Regression diagnostics 
p-value joint significance 
of variables 0.000 0.000 
p-value joint significance 
party dummies 0.000 0.000 
Observations 156 154 
Share correct classifications 
(exact hit/absolute classifi-
cation error <=1) 
0.376/0.732 0.413/0.671 
Pseudo-R2 0.081 0.208 
Party: FDP (liberal party) dummy not included; *marginal effect at mode (Q4: 7, Q5: 9);  
*/**/***: significant at 10/5/1 percent level. 
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Table 7: Ordered probit estimation control group: Tax policy restrictions 
 
 
Q1: Mobility real 
capital 
Model 1a 
Q2: Mobility paper 
profits 
Model 1b 
Q3: Yardstick 
competition 
Model 1c 
Variable Coefficient Marginal 
effect* Coefficient 
Marginal 
effect* Coefficient 
Marginal 
effect* 
Information 
Public finance lecture -0.341 (0.288) 0.026 
-0.891*** 
(0.185) 0.039 
-0.208 
(0.285) 0.027 
Number of semesters 0.234** (0.098) -0.015 
0.083 
(0.100) -0.001 
0.150 
(0.166) -0.019 
Other individual characteristics 
German 0.117 (0.293) -0.006 
0.276 
(0.171) 0.203 
-0.021 
(0.530) 0.702 
Female 0.559* (0.312) -0.054 
0.291*** 
(0.111) 0.413*** 
-0.057*** 
(0.109) 0.000 
Party 
CDU/CSU -0.192** (0.086) 0.009 
-0.489*** 
(0.103) -0.014 
0.197 
(0.185) -0.027 
SPD -0.426*** (0.056) 0.018 
0.007 
(0.053) 0.000 
0.384*** 
(0.117) -0.052 
GREENS -0.427*** (0.112) 0.002 
-0.993*** 
(0.153) -0.104 
0.804*** 
(0.275) -0.137 
LEFT PARTY -1.484*** (0.263) -0.189 
-0.802*** 
(0.283) -0.082 
-0.351 
(0.373) 0.028 
Regression diagnostics 
p-value joint signifi-
cance of variables 0.000 0.000 0.000 
p-value joint signifi-
cance party dummies 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 72 72 72 
Share correct 
classifications 
(exact hit/absolute 
classification error 
<=1) 
0.325/0.554 0.349/0.675 0.277/0.506 
Pseudo-R2 0.038 0.061 0.029 
Party: FDP (liberal party) dummy not included; *marginal effect at mode (Q1: 6, Q2: 7, Q3: 3); 
*/**/***: significant at 10/5/1 percent level. 
 29
Table 8: Ordered probit estimation control group: Tax policy 
 
Q4: Autonomy of tax policy 
Model 2a 
Q5: Preference minimum taxes 
Model 2b 
Variable Coefficient Marginal effect* Coefficient Marginal effect* 
Perceived restrictions 
Real mobility (Q1) -0.033 (0.103) -0.003 
0.018 
(0.100) -0.003 
Paper profits (Q2) -0.012 (0.070) -0.001 
0.004 
(0.134) -0.001 
Yardstick (Q3) -0.002 (0.031) 0.000 
-0.052 
(0.062) 0.007 
Information 
Public finance lecture 0.668* (0.400) 0.060 
-0.052 
(0.428) 0.007 
Number of semesters -0.166** (0.075) -0.013 
-0.059 
(0.134) 0.008 
Other individual characteristics 
German 0.205 (0.539) 0.020 
0.622* 
(0.336) -0.061 
Female -0.085 (0.475) -0.007 
-0.218 
(0.553) 0.030 
Party preference 
CDU/CSU 0.227*** (0.055) 0.014 
0.214 
(0.311) -0.032 
SPD 0.395*** (0.098) 0.024 
1.430*** 
(0.277) -0.195 
GREENS -0.543*** (0.098) -0.065 
1.110** 
(0.565) -0.167 
LEFT PARTY -1.551*** (0.302) -0.212 
-0.201* 
(0.111) 0.026 
Regression diagnostics 
p-value joint significance 
of variables 0.000 0.000 
p-value joint significance 
party dummies 0.000 0.000 
Observations 72 72 
Share correct 
classifications 
(exact hit/absolute classi-
fication error <=1) 
0.229/0.518 0.244/0.439 
Pseudo-R2 0.056 0.076 
Party: FDP (liberal party) dummy not included; *marginal effect at mode (Q4: 6, Q5: 3); 
*/**/***: significant at 10/5/1 percent level. 
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Table 9: Ordered probit estimation: Tax policy restrictions 
with left-right-indicator 
 
Q1: Mobility real 
capital 
Model 1a 
Q2: Mobility paper prof-
its 
Model 1b 
Q3: Yardstick 
competition 
Model 1c 
Variable Coefficient Marginal 
effect* Coefficient 
Marginal 
effect* Coefficient 
Marginal 
effect* 
Education 
Secondary (“Abitur”) 0.350*** (0.128) 0.049 
0.268 
(0.342) 0.008 
-0.012 
(0.200) 0.003 
Tertiary 0.193 (0.172) 0.026 
-0.273 
(0.544) 0.005 
-0.194 
(0.223) 0.045 
Information 
Economic/business -0.214 (0.430) -0.029 
-0.234** 
(0.109) -0.006 
0.020 
(0.209) -0.005 
“Freiberufler” -0.286*** (0.089) -0.040 
0.405*** 
(0.153) -0.013 
0.278** 
(0.123) -0.063 
Years in Bundestag 0.053*** (0.012) 0.007 
-0.038*** 
(0.009) -0.000 
-0.007 
(0.016) 0.002 
Member financial commit-
tee 
0.386*** 
(0.118) 0.042 
-0.131 
(0.138) -0.003 
0.155 
(0.135) -0.036 
Member budget committee -0.399 (0.258) -0.057 
0.302 
(0.365) -0.006 
0.026 
(0.098) 0.006 
Other individual characteristics 
Eastern Germany 0.277 (0.234) 0.032 
-0.871*** 
(0.153) -0.070 
0.770*** 
(0.213) -0.163 
Female 0.566*** (0.189) 0.062 
0.307* 
(0.173) -0.003 
0.122 
(0.161) -0.028 
Party list -0.153 (0.168) -0.020 
-0.259*** 
(0.073) -0.001 
-0.255* 
(0.132) 0.059 
Age -0.012 (0.008) -0.002 
0.011 
(0.007) 0.000 
0.002 
(0.008) -0.000 
State characteristics 
Unemployment rate 0.015 (0.022) 0.002 
0.095 
(0.068) 0.001 
-0.056* 
(0.032) 0.013 
GDP per capita 0.000 (0.000) 0.002 
0.000 
(0.000) 0.000 
0.000 
(0.000) 0.000 
Party 
Left-right indicator 
Benoit/Laver (2006) 
0.209*** 
(0.037) 0.027 
-0.124*** 
(0.033) -0.001 
0.029 
(0.028) 0.007 
Regression diagnostics 
p-value joint significance 
of variables 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 157 156 157 
Share correct 
classifications 
(exact hit/absolute classifi-
cation error <=1) 
0.223/0.694 0.276/0.686 0.217/0.465 
Pseudo-R2 0.115 0.076 0.017 
 *marginal effect at mode (Q1: 7, Q2: 7, Q3: 2); */**/***: significant at 10/5/1 percent level. 
 
